Abstract-Crowdsourcing systems allocate tasks to a group of workers over the Internet, which have become an effective paradigm for human-powered problem solving, such as image classification, optical character recognition, and proofreading. In this paper, we focus on incentivizing crowd workers to label a set of multi-class labeling tasks under strict budget constraint. We properly profile the tasks' difficulty levels and workers' quality in crowdsourcing systems, where the collected labels are aggregated with sequential Bayesian approach. To stimulate workers to undertake crowd labeling tasks, the interaction between workers and the platform is modeled as a reverse auction. We reveal that the platform utility maximization could be intractable, for which an incentive mechanism that determines the winning bid and payments with polynomial-time computation complexity is developed. Moreover, we theoretically prove that our mechanism is truthful, individually rational, and budget feasible. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate that our mechanism utilizes budget efficiently to achieve high platform utility with polynomial computation complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N RECENT years, online crowdsourcing systems such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) have become flourishing for human computation. The paradigm of crowdsourcing provides access to a group of workers over the Internet who are available to solve problems such as image labeling, optical character recognition and proofreading. Projects like reCAPTCHA [1] have made it possible to harness human resources solving learning problems. MTurk establishes a market where a "crowdsourcer" can submit batches of small tasks, and any workers can pick them up in exchange for monetary rewards. There are a vast amount of such small labeling tasks in practice, like differentiating the animal in a picture and classifying galaxies into different categorizations according to their shapes in Galaxy Zoo. Besides, many semantic analysis tasks such as proofreading can be decomposed into a series of labeling tasks, therefore labeling tasks are much more fundamental. With the proliferation of smartphone and mobile network, workers can solve the crowdsourcing problems using the smartphone through mobile network, like choosing the labeling answers in MTurk and Galaxy Zoo. The feasibility of mobile network makes a wide range of people more easily to perform crowdsourced tasks anytime and anywhere.
Incentivizing adequate workers to undertake labeling tasks is crucial to the system. Several platforms provide workers with non-monetary incentives like entertainment [1] and information [2] ; however, incentivizing the crowd with monetary payments is more effective [3] - [6] , where the task allocation and pricing are vitally important. Since the crowdsourcer often faces budget constraints and workers are diverse in their skills and backgrounds, designing effective allocation and pricing schemes is non-trivial. Karger et al. [7] allocate tasks with a random bipartite graph. However, they first assume that the platform can access any worker repeatedly, which is not true in practice. Secondly, they merely price each task with equal amount of monetary rewards, which is not enough to attract diverse workers. Yang et al. [8] propose two types of incentive mechanisms for maximizing the utility of the mobile sensing applications. Incentive mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing can hardly be applied to the crowd labeling system, where it is inappropriate to evaluate workers' contribution by working time.
In practice, the labels provided by the crowd could be very noisy. On one hand, the crowd is anonymous and transient. They may arbitrarily submit their labeling answers oblivious to the question, therefore get rewards free of effort by providing useless labels. On the other hand, crowd workers are of different levels of expertise and tasks may vary in difficulty levels. Some workers may provide more reliable labeling answers than others. It is still an open question how to effectively aggregate collected labels. Karger et al. [9] use a probabilistic model to analyze the crowd quality and aggregate collected labels with low-rank approximation which provides the trade-off between task accuracy and worker redundancy after collecting workers' labels and knowing workers' quality. Raykar et al. [10] manage to improve labeling accuracy by discriminating workers with scores. These label aggregation methods, however, do not mention how the incentive mechanisms should be designed correspondingly.
In this paper, we design a truthful and budget feasible mechanism to incentivize crowd workers to undertake the 0733-8716 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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multi-class labeling tasks and collect the tasks' answers, where the labeling answer can be 1, 2, . . . , K . The interaction between the platform and the workers is modeled as a reverse auction because the platform needs to buy the "wisdom" of workers. The platform publicizes a set of labeling tasks, after which workers can submit bids for a subset of tasks according to their preferences. For performing tasks, each worker has a private cost and claims it publicly in the bid. The platform then determines the set of winning workers and each winning worker is paid with an amount of money in exchange for the labeling answers. The mechanism mainly consists of winning bid allocation scheme and payment scheme, which together guarantee truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget feasibility. With our mechanism, each worker's optimal strategy is to disclose the true cost in his bid. Moreover, the total payment determined by the mechanism is under strict budget constraint for the sake of the crowdsourcer. The mechanism is individual rational in the sense that the payment must cover the cost. To profile the labeling difficulty, we propose to associate each task with a soft label, which is the probability that the task receives a certain label from a reliable worker. To recognize the quality of crowd workers, we propose to use one-coin model in [11] . Bayesian sequential approach is applied to update the soft labels and quality parameters based on crowd answers. Accordingly, the platform determines true answers of tasks by calculating the posterior with collected labels. The platform utility is defined as the difference between prior and posterior of all soft labels. Adapting label aggregation into the reverse auction based mechanism is non-trivial. To this end, we overcome the following two challenges: 1) The platform utility maximization can be formulated as a Markov Decision Process (MDP), the optimal solution of which can be found by backward induction that is mathematically intractable.
2) The payment scheme should guarantee truthfulness and budget feasibility simultaneously. We design a winning bid allocation scheme that is computationally efficient. For better representation, we first assume the workers are uniformly perfect. Then we further apply our allocation scheme to the general case where the workers are of diverse quality. Our payment scheme is developed by adapting the budget feasible mechanism proposed by Singer [12] . We summarize our contributions as follows.
• We model the interaction between the platform and crowd workers as a reverse auction. Our model can be used to solve multi-labeling tasks as well as binary tasks.
• We introduce the soft label and the quality parameter to profile tasks and workers, respectively. The maximization of the platform utility is formulated as a Markov Decision Process whose optimal solution is intractable.
• We design a winning bid allocation algorithm for uniform, and diverse workers, respectively. The algorithm runs in polynomial time to achieve computational efficiency. We then present our payment scheme to guarantee truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget feasibility. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model, the reverse auction framework and label aggregation to formulate the mathematical problem. Then, we propose our mechanism in Section III. The theoretical analysis of the proposed mechanism is presented in Section IV. In Section V, we evaluate the performance of our mechanism. Section VI reviews the related work and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Reverse Auction Framework
We are interested in predicting true labels of multi-class labeling tasks, by requiring a group of crowd workers. In the crowdsourcing system, the interaction between the platform and the crowd workers can be modeled as a reverse auction. Crowd workers sell their wisdom to the platform by providing their labeling answers. We describe the main notations in TABLE I and the auction framework is illustrated as follows:
1) The platform publicizes a set M = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t M } of multi-class labeling tasks to a set of N = {1, 2, . . . , N} crowd workers, in which the tasks are profiled by a set of labels
where θ j ⊂ M is a set of tasks, and b j is the charge worker j claims for performing θ j . 3) The platform sequentially determines the winning bid set, W ⊆ = j ∈N j , from all submitted bids. It selects a bid into the current winning bid set, observes the labeling answers, and updates the posterior distributions before selecting the next one. 4) Each winning bid, j ∈ W , is paid an amount of money p( j ) by the platform. The platform infers true labels according to the posterior distributions of the soft labels. Meanwhile, each bid j has an associated cost c(θ j ) ∈ R + . The cost of performing the tasks θ j is private and only known to worker j . Each worker strategically determines b j to maximizing his own utility. We define the utility of a worker as follows.
Definition 1 (Worker's Utility): The utility of a worker is defined as the difference between the payment it receives and his cost.
(1)
B. Aggregating Labels From Perfect Workers
The platform publicizes a set M = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t M } of multi-class labeling tasks, and employs a set N = {1, 2, . . . , N} of crowd workers to label them. Each task is associated with a true label z i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , K }, i = 1, 2, . . . , M. We denote a labeling answer for task t i ∈ θ j from crowd worker j as y i j ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , K }. Each answer y i j has a corresponding vector A (a 1 , a 2 , . ., a K ). Only one element in A equals to '1', while others equals to '0', Where a k = 1 represents worker j attach label 'k' (k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , K }) to this task. The platform views y i j as a random variable Y i j before the inquiry.
A soft label set
is used to measure the labeling difficulty of task t i . ω k is defined as the probability that the task t i is labeled as label 'k' by a perfectly reliable worker. 
where
and (u) = ∞ 0 t u−1 e −t dt. Observing a labeling answer Y i j = y, we can calculate the posterior distribution by Bayes' rule:
Due to fact that Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior of Multinomial distribution, the posterior will become Dir( 
When we have no prior knowledge about the task, we can simply set α 0 i = {1, 1, . . . , 1}, so that the prior is a uniform distribution. The true label z i is inferred in accordance with the parameter ω i,k in the soft label set Ω i , which indicates that
C. Aggregating Labels From Diverse Workers
In practice, crowd workers are diverse in the quality.
To describe the quality of the worker, we introduce another
, where δ j,k is introduced to capture the quality of worker j labeling label 'k' to the task. One way to obtain Δ j is using workers' historical data and implementing gold standard to get the parameter set. Since we focus on incentive mechanism, the details of training Δ j is beyond the scope of this paper. We model the distribution of Y i j by adopting one-coin model
As δ j,k increases, the quality of worker j also increases in the sense that the distribution of Y i j gets closer to the underlying
worker j becomes a perfect worker.
Similarly, the quality Δ j is drawn from a known Dirichlet prior distribution Dir(β 0
Assuming that i and Δ j are independent, the prior joint distribution is the product of the two Dirichlet distributions. Given a labeling answer from the crowd, the posterior distribution can be calculated by Bayes' rule:
In the posterior distribution, i and Δ j are highly correlated with a joint distribution. Since these two parameters are corresponding to labeling difficult and worker's quality respectively, the posterior distribution can be modeled as product of the following two distributions given conditional independence:
wherep( i |Y i j = y) andp(Δ j |Y i j = y) are two Dirichlet distributions with modified parameters. By approximation, the posterior distributions of ω i,k and δ j,k are still two independent distributions. Thus we can adopt the sequential allocation method. The detail of the approximation is revealed in the next section.
D. Problem Formulation
Suppose by the end of task allocation, each task t i receives labeling answers which can be represented as a vector y i from the crowd and the posterior distributions of i becomes p( i |y i ). Intuitively, if the posterior distribution is very different from the prior, our knowledge of the soft label is largely improved. We use the Kullback-Leibler divergence to measure the difference of two probability distributions and define the platform utility as follows.
Definition 2 (Platform Utility): Platform utility is defined as the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the initial distribution and the final distribution of the soft labels.
Under a strict budget constraint B, the platform aims to determine a winning bid set that maximizes its utility in expectation, i.e.
Problem defined in Eq. (9) is NP-hard, here we briefly elaborate the reasons. Consider a simpler case where each bid has a fixed marginal value, thus we can rewrite the simpler problem as follows:
where v j is the fixed marginal value. The problem defined in the above formula is a typical knapsack problem which is NPhard. Since the marginal value of a bid is also dependent on the already selected bids, the objective function of Eq. (9) is more complex. Therefore problem defined in Eq. (9) is NP-hard. If the platform pays exactly the price workers claim, p( j ) = b j , to every winning bid, the maximization problem can be formulated as a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which is described by a tuple {B r , r , S r , Pr(Y i j |S r )}. Here, at current allocation round r , B r is the remaining budget. The action space r is all the remaining bids whose costs do not exceed the remaining budget. The state space S r is all possible posterior parameters of soft labels, and quality parameters if workers are diverse. The transition probability Pr(Y i j |S r ) has been described in our system model.
At each allocation round r , the platform can choose a r from r as a winning bid and cover its cost with remaining budget. If r is submitted by worker j on tasks θ j , the expected reward of r is
where u r p is the platform utility at round r . With the MDP in place, we can apply backward induction [13] to compute the optimal winning bid allocation scheme. However, this solution has two problems: 1) Since the cardinality of the state space |S r | grows exponentially with the number of submitted bids, the optimal solution to solve the selection problem is NP-hard. 2) Due to selfishness, workers strategically determine their claimed prices to maximize their own utilities, hindering the platform from hiring wisdom with lower payments.
Thus, our mechanism should be computationally efficient and truthful. 
In order to maximize his utility, a worker will disclose the cost truthfully. Besides, the mechanism should also have the following desired properties.
Definition 5 (Individual Rationality): The utility of a winning bid is nonnegative.
Definition 6 (Budget Feasibility): The total payment to winning bids is less than the budget.
Remarks: The importance of above two properties is obvious. To stimulate crowd workers to participate in task labeling, their costs must be covered by the payments. Budget feasibility guarantees that the mechanism can be implemented in practice and satisfy the basic requirement.
III. ALLOCATION AND PAYMENT SCHEME
A. Allocation Scheme for Perfect Workers
We present our winning bid allocation UN-GREEDY-MUL for perfect workers in this subsection. The allocation scheme is adaptive, i.e. the platform selects a bid, collects the labeling answer Y i j = y, and updates the posterior distribution of ω i before choosing the next one.
Suppose in the current allocation round r , the distribution
Once j is selected into W , v( j ) is used instead of v( j ; r ) to simplify notations. The total value of W is simply the sum of all marginal values, i.e.
Instead of measuring expected increment in platform utility, the marginal value is the myopic K-L difference between two successive allocation rounds. With this definition in place, the set function V ( W ) falls in the family of monotone submodular functions. 
and it is monotonic if and only if f (X) ≤ f (Y ).
Theorem 1: The value function of the winning bid set is monotone submodular.
Proof: The value function is monotonic since the K-L divergence is always positive. We only need to show the marginal value v( j ; r ) is monotonic decreasing with r to prove the submodularity. The marginal value is the sum of expectation taken over the answer Y i j according to Eq. (14) , which follows Multinomial distribution. Since bid j of worker j contains a set of tasks θ j and its marginal value is the cumulative K-L divergence of the labeling tasks:
we only need to prove that each term of K-L divergence is submodular to obtain the submodularity of marginal value v( j ; r ). Suppose X r i = {α r i,1 , α r i,2 , α r i,3 , . . . , α r i,K }, the probability that Y i j = k can be calculated as follows:
The remainder of the proof is left over in the Appendix-A.
Algorithm 1 UN-GREEDY-MUL: Allocation Scheme for Uniform Workers
Input: set M of multi-class labeling tasks; set = { 1 , 2 , . . . , N } of all bid bundles submitted by workers, where
; Output: set W ⊆ of winning bid bundles; The values V ( W ) of all winning bid bundles; posterior parameters vector
Observe the labeling answer
With this Lemma in place, we present our winning bid selection method in Algorithm 1. In each allocation round r , the algorithm greedily selects the bid * that has the largest value per unit cost, i.e. * = {θ j * , b j * } ← arg max
Then we check if the candidate * satisfies the proportional share rule on a reduced budget B/β, β ≥ 1 to ensure budget feasibility, i.e.
.
If it holds, * wins and the platform acquires the labeling answers to update posterior distributions. If the candidate * doesn't satisfy the proportional share rule, we simply discard it and the allocation goes into the next round. It should be mentioned that the allocation scheme is an offline process in which the number of worker will not change. The choice of β ≥ 1 will be discussed as part of the proof of budget feasibility.
B. Allocation Scheme for Diverse Workers
When taking the quality of crowd workers into consideration, the allocation scheme is almost the same except that the distribution parameters of i , Δ j are updated by the approximation method. With the prior distributions of i , Δ j being Dir( α i ), Dir( β), respectively, the joint posterior distribution conditioned on the observed label Y i j = y ∀t i ∈ θ j is the product of two independent Dirichlet distributions with modified parameters,
The values of α i (y), and β i (y) are calculated by moment matching through setting the first and second moments of We present the winning bid allocation scheme for heterogeneous workers in Algorithm 2.
C. Payment Scheme
The payment scheme should guarantee truthfulness such that each worker reveals his true cost in the bid to maximize his utility, i.e. b j = c(θ j ). Each winning bid is paid its threshold payment, which is equal to the highest price that still makes the bid win. Therefore the payment scheme for perfect and diverse workers can be unified, and the intuition behind is described as follows. Let us number the winning bids as W = { 1 , 2 , . . . , i , . . . , k } in the order of their selection when running the algorithm on the original bid set . We now consider the payment to the i -th allocated bid, p( i ). Running the allocation algorithm on the alternate set = \ { i }, we get an alternate allocation set W = { 1 , 2 , . . . , j , . . . , k }, in the order of their selection.
To avoid confusion, we use b( j ) to denote the price that j ∈ W declares. Now i from W wants to make a bid b i( j ) to replace j in W . This price should be low enough to make ω j 's value per cost larger than that of j , i.e.
Algorithm 2 DI-GREEDY-MUL: Allocation Scheme for Diverse Workers
Input: M ; N ; ; budget B; prior parameters
where v i( j ) is the marginal value of j if it has to replace j in W . Moreover, b i( j ) should be low enough to follow the proportional share rule, i.e.
W denotes the first j − 1 elements in W . Hence, the maximum price that j can declare to replace j is b i( j ) = min(η i( j ) , ρ i( j ) ). The final payment to i takes the maximum value over the possible k + 1 positions in W ,
In the next section, we will show that this is exactly the threshold payment of θ i in part of the proof of truthfulness.
IV. MECHANISM ANALYSIS
According the well-known statement by Myerson [14] , a mechanism if truthful if and only if 1) the winning bid allocation is monotonic, and 2) each winning bid is paid the threshold payment. We will show our mechanism satisfies these two conditions to finish the proof of truthfulness. 
The proof of Theorem 3 is in Appendix-D.
The allocation scheme is based on the proportional share rule that runs on a fraction of the total budget B/β, where β ≥1 is the budget fraction ratio. Intuitively, a larger β better guarantees the budget constraint, while a smaller β better utilizes the budget. Next, we will show that β = 2 achieves the best trade-off between the two considerations.
Assume the winning bid selection runs with full budget B first, i.e. β = 1, with W = { 1 , 2 , . . . , i , . . . , k } being the winning bids. We will upper bound the payment p( i ) ∈ W , by bounding the maximum raise i can make in its bid b i and still wins. We formalize it in the next lemma.
Lemma 3: When full budget is used in the winning bid selection algorithm, the maximum bid b i that a winning bid can make and still wins is upper bounded by
With this lemma in place, the proof of the budget feasibility is straight forward.
Theorem 4: Our mechanism achieves budget feasibility, i.e.
by choosing the budget fraction ratio
Refer to Appendix-E for the proofs of Lemma 3 and Theorem 4.
Theorem 5: Both winning bid allocation scheme and payment scheme are computationally efficient with computation complexity O(| | 2 log | |) and O(|
See Appendix-F for the proof of Theorem 5.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To effectively evaluate the performance of our mechanism, we implement our winning bid allocation algorithms UN-GREEDY-MUL and DI-GREEDY-MUL with comparisons to the following algorithms:
• UN-RANDOM-MUL regards all workers as uniform and perfect. It randomly chooses a bid outside the current winning bid set as the candidate. The candidate also needs to respect the proportional share rule before becoming a winning bid while the winning set has the same cardinality as UN-GREEDY-MUL.
• DI-RANDOM-MUL is the equivalent to UN-RANDOM-MUL in the sense that it incorporates workers' quality levels to update posterior distributions. The performance metrics includes running time, platform utility, and budget utilization. To evaluate the computation efficiency, we compare the running time of the greedy algorithms against random algorithms. We then evaluate platform utility to show that our mechanism outperforms the random allocation scheme. Finally, we compute the total payment to show that our mechanism efficiently takes advantage of the budget under strict constraints. The results are based on the results where K = 3.
A. Running Time
We set the cost of each bids as normally distributed with mean and variance (5.5, 1), and vary the number of submitted bids N from 100 to 600 for different allocation algorithms. From Fig. 1 we observe that UN-RANDOM-MUL outperforms UN-GREEDY-MUL since it does not perform sorting operation. Nevertheless, the running time of UN-GREEDY-MUL is also acceptable since it increases linearly with the number of bids N. The increment of budget does not lead to significant variance of time, that is the budget B will not affect running time remarkably. The results for DI-GREEDY-MUL and DI-RANDOM-MUL are the same which are shown in Fig. 2 .
B. Platform Utility
We first assume the cost is normally distributed with parameters (5.5, 1) and vary the budget B. The platform utility with perfect workers is shown in Fig. 3 . For 400 bids, UN-GREEDY-MUL outperforms UN-RANDOM-MUL for all budget constraints. As budget increases, both platform utilities of UN-RANDOM-MUL and of UN-GREEDY-MUL have steady increments. Besides, the results indicate that a platform has more budget can obtain better utility. As the number of bids N reduces to 200, platform utility also decreases, which reveals that platform with a great number of bids brings more utility. The similar observations are also obtained from the diverse quality case, which are depicted in Fig. 4 . We also provide the platform utility of DI-GREEDY-MUL compared to a benchmark algorithm which only chooses bids with budget B, but does not need to calculate the payments and maintain the economic properties. It has been proved that the benchmark algorithm obtains a suboptimal result which is at least (1 − 1/e) ratio of the optimal results. The results of DI-GREEDY-MUL and the benchmark algorithm are shown in Fig. 5 . From the figure, we know that DI-GREEDY-MUL can achieve a platform utility in the same level as that of the benchmark algorithm, that is DI-GREEDY-MUL at least has a constant ratio compared to the truthful optimal algorithm.
The platform utility is sum of K-L divergence. Since K-L divergence is tightly related to entropy which reflects the uncertainty of labeling tasks, we will demonstrate that the uncertainty is heavily mitigated after workers report their label answers in Fig. 6 .
C. Budget Utilization
We compute the total payment corresponding to UN-GREEDY-MUL and UN-RANDOM-MUL as budget B ranging from 30 to 300 with 30 increase each time. The number of bids is set to 400 and the cost follows normal distribution with parameters (5.5, 1). We illustrate the budget utilization ratio P/B in Fig. 7 . The results show that our allocation algorithms utilize budget much more efficient than the random allocation scheme. When budget increases, the ratio of total payment decreases. We can get the same results from the DI-GREEDY-MUL and DI-RANDOM-MUL in Fig. 8 .
D. Impact of Cost Distribution
We generate the costs of bids according to three distributions: uniform distribution (UNM), normal distribution (NORM) and exponential distribution (EXP) with equal mean value 5.5. The variance of the normal distribution is set as 1. The results for the three distributions are shown in Fig. 9 , which implies that the platform utility is not tightly related to the cost distribution form. Besides, since the costs in exponential distribution are more likely have low values, its platform utility will be a bit larger.
E. Binary Labeling Case
We have discussed the results with the case of multiple labels. As a comparison, we present the performance evaluation of binary labeling bids including running time, platform utility, and budget utilization. Without loss of generality, we take the diverse quality case as an example. From Fig. 10 , we observe that the running time of DI-RANDOM-BI still outperforms DI-GREEDY-BI. Meanwhile, the running time of both DI-GREEDY-BI and DI-RANDOM-BI increase with the number of bids N. Due to its lower computational complexity, the running time of DI-GREEDY-BI is less than DI-GREEDY-MUL.
1) Running Time of Binary Labeling Bids:
2) Platform Utility of Binary Labeling Bids: The platform utility of binary labeling bids is shown in Fig. 11 . Similar to multiple labeling bids, DI-GREEDY-BI outperforms DI-RANDOM-BI for all budget constraints. As budget increases, platform utility of DI-RANDOM-BI and platform utility of DI-GREEDY-BI will both increase. As the number of bids N reduces to 200, platform utility also decreases. Comparing to binary labeling case, multiple labeling allocation scheme has a better platform utility due to more precise label profiling.
3) Budget Utilization of Binary Labeling Bids: According to Fig. 12 , we observe that the Greedy algorithm can utilize the budget more efficiently than the random one, which is similar to the case of multiple labeling bids discussed previously. 
F. Utility for K = 5
To prove the generality of our algorithm, we provide the platform utility when K = 5. The platform utility with perfect workers is shown in Fig. 13 . For 400 bids, UN-GREEDY-MUL outperforms UN-RANDOM-MUL for all budget constraints. As budget increases, both platform utilities of UN-RANDOM-MUL and of UN-GREEDY-MUL have steady increments. Besides, the results indicate that a platform has more budget can obtain better utility. As the number of bids N reduces to 200, platform utility also decreases. Besides, the platform utility is larger than the case where K = 3. The similar observations are also obtained from the diverse quality case, which are depicted in Fig. 14. 
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Crowd Label Collection and Aggregation
Many of the previous works focus on information aggregation in a crowdsourcing scenario where we have to infer the true label with a bunch of noisy labels. Karger et al. [7] , [9] allocate labeling tasks according to a bipartite graph and infer the true label with an iterative learning algorithm, or low-rank matrix approximation. Raykar et al. [10] , [15] propose a probabilistic framework with multiple annotators providing labels but no absolute gold standard. Some literature [11] collects and aggregates information from the crowd with sequential decision making, and proposes the near optimal policies, such as knowledge gradient. However, these papers assume that we can repeatedly access any worker for any tasks and fail to provide appropriate incentives.
B. Incentive Mechanisms for Crowd Sensing
Most existing incentive mechanisms focus on the system of mobile sensing applications. Yang et al. [8] design two incentive mechanisms for a user centric model and a platform centric model, respectively. In the platform centric model, a fixed amount of reward is provided for the users whose costs are common knowledge. In the user centric model, the costs of users are private information and users can bid reverse price. Duan et al. [16] propose a Stackelberg game model to motivate users to collaboratively collect data, in which both complete information scenario and incomplete information scenario are discussed. He et al. [17] , Feng et al. [18] , and Jaimes et al. [19] study the task allocation problem for location dependent tasks. Lee and BaikHoh [20] design a reverse auction based mechanism with dynamic price. Zhang and van der Schaar [21] design a non-monetary incentive mechanism based on participants' reputation. Feng et al. [22] propose a distributed algorithm to achieve stable matching in spectrum market. However, there are few works that adapt the desired properties such as truthfulness and budget feasibility into the setting of label collection.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a framework of reverse auction based incentive mechanism for label collection in crowdsourcing systems. We take into account the difficulty of labeling tasks and focus on maximizing the utility of the crowdsourcer. We have designed two winning bid allocation algorithms under different assumptions: UN-GREEDY-MUL can be applied to the case where the majority of crowd workers are of high reliability, and DI-GREEDY-MUL can be applied to a more general case where the workers are highly diverse. The proposed mechanism is easy to implement in practice, and has strong theoretical guarantees such as truthfulness, individual rationality, budget feasibility and computation efficiency.
We can carry the future work along the following directions. First, the tasks can be extended to non-labeling cases, in which a task may be proofreading and semantic analysis. Second, since the workers may arrive and leave at any time online, we can extend our mechanism to this highly dynamic scenario.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF SUBMODULARITY
The K-L divergence of two Dirichlet distributions is
is the digamma function. In the setting of uniform workers, the marginal value of a term t i ∈ θ j at round r can be calculated as 
To prove v(t i ; r ) is monotonic decreasing with r , we shall show that v( α ) ≤ v( α), for α ≥ α. Since each α r i, j is symmetric, we only need to show that
, for m > 0 and any complex z not equal to a negative integer [23] . We have
Since ψ (1) 
Thus,
We get another inequality from
Submitting (24), (25) into (21) ends the proof.
APPENDIX B POSTERIOR CALCULATION
Assuming, at the current state, i and Δ j are independent, and β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β K ) ). To simplify the notation, we let
The posterior distribution conditioned on Y i j can be calculated using Bayes' rule:
where the likelihood Pr(
and
Then, we use variational approximation by first assuming the conditional independence of i and Δ j :
In particular, we have the exact form for the marginal distributions:
We use the moment matching technique to approximate the marginal distributions of Δ j , i as two Dirichlet distributions.
In particular, we approximate
Such that
To make (42) and (43) hold, we have:
Similarly, we approximate
To make (45) and (46) hold, we have:
Furthermore, we can compute the exact values forẼ
here
APPENDIX C PROOF OF TRUTHFULNESS
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Let's consider the following two cases after j lowers its price:
Case 1: By lowering b j tob j ,˜ j is chosen as the candidate in the same allocation round. Thus, we have
In this case,˜ j satisfies proportional share rule.
Case 2:˜ j is chosen as the candidate before j is chosen. In this case,˜ j satisfies the proportional share rule due to the monotone submodularity of the value function.
where˜ W denotes the winning bid set right before˜ j is chosen as the candidate. Notice˜ j cannot be chosen after j since our determination rule is greedy.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
The payment to each winning bid in W is given as
Assume by replaces m-th winning bid in W , i can declare the maximum bid, i.e p( j ) = b i(m) . We only need to show that i cannot win if his bid
Submitting a price higher than η i(m) places i after the unallocated bid k +1 in W . Thus, i cannot win.
Case 2: According to observation 1) we have v i(i) = v( i ). Then
and 
In the last inequality, v( j ) ≤ v( i ) holds due to the decreasing marginal value property. In this case, b i is strictly upper bounded by the proportional value of i . Case 2: R = ∅.
. Still, we have
Hence α ≤
. Now, consider replacing j with some r 0 ∈ R after j −1 W . It must hold that the marginal value per cost of r 0 is higher than that of the whole R . To simplify notations, we use v( | ) =
to denote the marginal value of a bid , if it is selected after a set of bids . We have
The second inequality is due to the submodularity of the value function. Since j is chosen as the candidate at position j instead of r0 , we have
Observing that 
which leads to
Combining the constraints on α together, we have α = 2.
Hence,
V ( W ) · B holds in the above two cases.
B. Proof of Theorem 4
Running the winning bid allocation algorithm with B/2, we have
Since p( i ) is the threshold payment, i.e. p( i ) = sup{b i :
i ∈ W }, by taking the supremum we have
APPENDIX F PROOF OF COMPUTATION EFFICIENCY
A. Proof of Theorem 5
In winning bid allocation algorithm, the sorting before selecting the candidate bid 
